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In the  current  conjuncture,  the  international  community is gripped by 
the  problem  of  how  to  mitigate  the  impact  of  ﬁnancial  crisis  on 
emerging  markets  while  curbing  the  drift  towards  protectionism.  The 
historical  experiences  of  Mexico  and  Turkey  in  this  regard  are 
instructive.  Both  banking  sectors  have  suﬀered  harsh  crises  since  the 
mid 1990s, were rescued, and then restructured without closing oﬀ their 
economies. To date, liberal and institutional political economic analyses 
of  emerging  market  have  mostly  framed  the  problem  with  principal 
reference  to  crisis  and  the  formal  market‐enhancing  institutions  of 
banking. The  debates  have  then revolved  around  how  either greater or 
lesser  exposure  to  ﬁnancial  imperatives  can  improve  stability  and 
resolve developmental challenges. By and  large,  these debates have not 
addressed  the  problem  of  bank  rescues  and  the  underlying  social 
relations  of  power  that  shape  changes  to  the  institutions  of banking. 
The  following, by  contrast,  compares Mexico’s  1995 and Turkey’s 2001 
bank  rescues  from  a  historical  materialist  framework.  Therein,  the 
rescues are  interpreted as historical processes  that have revamped pre‐
existing  institutionalized  sets of  social power  relations.  Above all  else, 
the  impact  of  banking  crisis‐driven  rescues  has  meant  the  historical‐
structural  deepening  of ﬁnancial  imperatives  in Mexican  and  Turkish 
society. This has had the socio‐political consequence of reinforcing the 
power  of  ﬁnance  and  further  eroding  once  legitimate  channels  of 
popular inﬂuence over national development. The experiences of Mexico 







But  the situation worsened  in October following the  collapse of Lehman  Brothers and,  in 
the words of  IMF  Chief Strauss‐Kahn, we came very close to  “a total  collapse of  the world 
economy”. Plummeting currencies,  capital  ﬂight, falling commodity prices,  job  losses, and 
stock market collapse dispelled any hope that the wave of ﬁnancial havoc might not hit the 
shores of the global south and  spill over  into a world ﬁnancial  crisis. The American,  other 
advanced  industrialized countries’, and Chinese rescue packages were the most  immediate 
concern. Once approved  in early 2009,  the attention of  international ﬁnancial  institutions 
(IFIs) and world leaders turned to  the worsening prospects of the emerging markets, which 
are  expected  to  be  hit  hardest  in  2009  and  urgently  need  to  restore  conﬁdence  in  the 
ﬁnancial  sector,  according  to  an  early  February  2009  joint  IMF‐OECD‐World  Bank 
statement. Within weeks,  the Group of Seven (G‐7)  reinforced this concern,  underscoring 
that restructuring damaged banks and cleaning up the ﬁnancial sector is vital.
  The  importance  placed  on  banking  and  its  rescue  by  the  IFIs  and  G‐7  is  not 
misplaced:  “The  banking  system  is  the  bloodline  of  the  economy.  Without  that  system, 
nothing  can  happen.”  More  than  ever before,  banking  is  an  absolutely  central  activity  in 
society.  Chequing,  savings,  credit  cards,  and  payment  services  for water,  gas,  and  so  on, 
underpin  one’s  ability  to  work  and  participate  in  day‐to‐day  life.  Banks  also  coordinate 
longer‐term  plans  involving  loans,  mortgages,  retirement,  and  even  the  processing  of 
remittances  from  family  members  abroad.  In  many  emerging  markets,  moreover,  banks 
handle  large  amounts  of  oﬃcial  government  debt,  are  formally  linked  to  the  largest 
economic  groups,  and  serve  to  ﬁnancially  integrate  diﬀerent  regions  and  social  strata 
domestically  and  internationally.  The list  goes  on, with  the point  being  that  to  have  any 
degree of economic security – at  the level  of individual,  collective, ﬁrm, or state – without 
some relationship to a commercial bank is unimaginable. And this is why the possible social 
ramiﬁcations  of  the  current  banking  crisis  and  rescue  are  of  such  political  concern 
internationally.
  In  contrast  to  past  conjunctures  of  this  magnitude  whose  outcomes  were  shaped 
almost  exclusively  by  the  most  powerful  state  and  IFI  actors  (for  example,  the  Bretton 
Woods  agreement,  the  1980s  Volcker Shock,  and  the  1997  East  Asian meltdown  come  to 
mind),  the current conjuncture represents  a fracture  in  this  closed hierarchy of  interstate 
relations.  This  is  because  major  IFIs  and  the  US  have  asked  that  the  largest  emerging 
markets contribute to resolving the crisis through the Group of Twenty (G‐20) – a forum of 
advanced  industrialized  and  big  emerging  market  ﬁnance  ministers  and  central  bank 
governors  established  in  1999.  The  current  and  former  World  Bank  presidents,  Robert 
Zoellick and James Wolfensohn, have gone so  far as to  say the G‐20  should replace the G‐7. 
This  unprecedented  call  to  multilateralism  is  surely  related  to  what  even  conservative 




ills  has  fallen  into  disrepute.  And  while  it  still  stretches  the  imagination  to  believe 
neoliberalism  is on  the precipice of collapse and that  emerging market  leaders will deﬁne 
the agenda and outcome, any coordinated response to the world ﬁnancial crisis will draw on 
the lessons learned from past banking rescues and restructuring in the global south. This is 
because  these  earlier  crises  occurred  in  the  context  of  ﬁnance‐led  neoliberalism  (deﬁned 
below)  and,  most  importantly  for  the  G‐20,  the  rescues  have  proven  capable  of  staying 
within these conﬁnes. When all is said and done, that is the message being hammered home 
by the US and the IFIs: any new regulatory reforms must not “forfeit the economic beneﬁts 
of ﬁnancial  innovation and market  discipline”,  according to US Federal Reserve Chair Ben 
Bernanke.
  Mexico  and  Turkey  are  two  of  the  most  signiﬁcant  emerging  market  cases  of 
neoliberal  banking  rescue  since  the  1990s.  Both  are  existing  OECD  members  that 
aggressively  promoted  trade  and ﬁnancial  liberalization  in  the 1980s,  suﬀered  from  costly 
banking  crises,  and  then  restructured  without  sacriﬁcing  market  discipline  or  bank 
proﬁtability. The  1995 Mexican banking  crisis was  the ﬁrst major neoliberal banking  crisis 
and the 2001 Turkish crisis  the most recent  among  emerging markets. What’s more,  their 
banking sectors have proven remarkably resilient to  the impacts of the current crisis – even 
though their economies have not. The IMF suggests, for example, that the world crisis will 
have a  “modest”  impact on Mexican banks because they have become well  capitalized and 
highly  proﬁtable  (IMF  2009,  26).  The  Turkish  banks  have  also  remained  stable  and 
proﬁtable,  leading World  Bank  President  Zoellick  to  praise  its  ﬁnancial  sector as  “shock‐
proof”. The Turkish Minister of the Economy has even pressed the G‐20 to adopt aspects of 
its handling of the 2001 Turkish crisis  in response to  the current  crisis. Perhaps one of the 
most  extraordinary  things  about  Mexico  and  Turkey  in  the  neoliberal  era  is  how  their 
governments and ﬁnancial managers have proven exemplary at mobilizing crisis to advance 
market‐oriented possibilities (Marois 2008; Yılmaz 2007).
  When cast  in this  light, generalized claims that market and ﬁnancial discipline is in 
disrepute given the crisis seem to misguide when, in fact, the dominant responses are more 
consistent  than not with  the historical  forms of ﬁnance‐led  neoliberalism  found  in places 
like Mexico and Turkey.  In this line of reasoning,  I argue that the impact of banking crisis‐
driven  rescues  has  meant  the  historical‐structural  deepening  of  ﬁnancial  imperatives  in 
Mexican and Turkish society. This has had the socio‐political consequence of reinforcing the 
power of ﬁnance and  further  eroding  once  legitimate  channels  of popular  inﬂuence  over 
national development. This, too, appears so with the G‐20 response to crisis thus far.
  The argument’s point of departure therefore does not begin with debating the causes 
of  banking  crises. Rather,  this paper compares  the changing  institutionalizations of social 
relations of  power by working back and  forth among the historical  experiences of Mexico 
and Turkey. At one analytical  level, this involves the state ﬁnancial apparatus and how the 
bank  rescues have tended towards the socialization of debt and risk,  the rationalization of 
the  banking  sector,  and  the  internationalization  of  the  ﬁnancial  apparatus.  At  another 





the  paper  thus  analyzes  the  historical  modalities  of  banking  rescue  and  wider  market 
structures  relative  to  the  social  deepening  of  ﬁnance‐led  neoliberalism.  These  two  main 
analytical sections are preceded by a literature review and an overview of pre‐crisis banking 





et al.  2002 and Stallings 2006 adopt  similar distinctions). On  the one hand, Weberian and 
Keynesian‐inspired  analyses  advocate on behalf of extra‐market  institutional  coordination 
and a slower pace of ﬁnancial  reform  over the determinacy of the market forces (McKeen‐
Edwards et al. 2004). On the other hand, Smithian and Hayekian‐inspired analyses advocate 





  That said, Weberian analyses tend to  critique the shape of liberal  financial  orthodoxy 
since  the  1980s.  Ziya Öniş  (2006),  for  example,  argues  that  the  violent  ebbs  and  flows  of 
capitalist development can be overcome given  the right policy formation. He reads the 2001 
Turkish banking  crisis as rooted in  the premature  liberalization of  financial and trade flows 
and due  to  IMF policy orthodoxy not  tailored  to  the Turkish experience. Öniş  is uncertain 
whether the crisis‐driven reforms can yet  lead to virtuous cycles of growth, but he is hopeful 
that the European Union (EU)  and IMF will  serve as firm  policy anchors  for  future reforms 
that can  create sustained and crisis‐free growth. Ümit Cizre and Erinç Yeldan (2005), while 
emphasizing  more  Turkey’s  fragile  and  shallow  financial  markets,  likewise  suggest  that 
premature exposure to  foreign competition led to  the 2001 crisis.  By implication, more time 
and more mature markets might also avoid crisis in the future. Celso Garrido (2005)  follows a 
similar  line of inquiry  in  his critique of the Mexican  liberalization experience, which he too 
sees as flawed. Taken together,  these studies  reflect an increasingly dominant  theme  in the 
political  economy  of  finance  literature  –  namely,  the  importance  of  sequencing  financial 
reform (Johnston and Sundararajan 1999; Stallings 2006). By rejecting liberal orthodoxy,  this 
literature tends to reject ‘one size fits all’ applications of liberalization policy (cf. Rodrik 2008).
  The  second  camp  advocates  in  favor  of  liberal  ﬁnancial  orthodoxy  but  without 




distorted  the Mexican banking sector and contributed to  the  1995 banking crisis. To avoid 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crisis and  to  have more stable banking, Haber  argues  that  ﬁnancial  systems must  exhibit 
institutions that give bankers an incentive to behave in a prudent manner and borrowers an 
incentive  to  honor  credit  contracts  (2005,  2351).  He  concludes  that  Mexico  took  some 
advantage of the 1995 banking  crisis, but has yet to  be truly  successful  at  releasing market 
forces.  Commenting  on  the  current  crisis,  experts  of  developing  country  ﬁnance  Aslı 
Demirgüç‐Kunt  and  Luis  Servén  oﬀer  an  explicit  defense  of  liberal  ﬁnancial  orthodoxy 






current  crisis  is thus  interpreted  as  an opportunity to  improve regulation  and supervision 
without dampening  ﬁnancial  development  and  growth. An OECD Economics Department 




that  liberal  and  institutional  political  economic analyses  of  emerging market have mostly 
framed  the  problem  with  principal  reference  to  crisis  and  the  formal  market‐enhancing 
institutions of banking. The debates have then revolved around how either greater or lesser 
exposure  to  ﬁnancial  imperatives  can  improve  stability  and  resolve  developmental 
challenges.  ‘Institutions’  alone  thus  appear  to  serve  as  the ﬁnal  and  formative context  of 
change  (Cammack  1992; Przeworski  2004).  In doing  so,  these debates have not  addressed 
the problem of bank rescues and the underlying social relations of power that shape changes 
to the institutions of banking.




conﬁguration,  wherein  the  outcomes  of  neoliberal  crisis  have  technical  and  institutional 
dimensions,  but  ones  that  are  determined  by  domestic  and  international  political  forces 
(2004,  674).  Furthermore,  neoliberalism  is  ﬁnance‐led.  This  means  that  the  range  of 
developmental options available to individuals and collectives in society are more forcefully 
subjected  to  the  discipline of money,  creditworthiness,  and  speculative pressures  than  in 
earlier phases of capitalism  (Bello  2006).  This  is an expression of the  reasserted power of 
ﬁnance since the 1980s, wherein ‘ﬁnance’ denotes the upper fraction of capitalist owners and 
their  ﬁnancial  institutions  (Duménil  and  Lévy  2004,  660).  In  contrast  to  claims  that 
neoliberalism  is  imposed  by  foreign  actors  (see  Cizre  and  Yeldan  2005;  Morton  2003), 
Mexican and Turkish societies are not understood here as agentless victims. As Hamza Alavi 
(1982)  reminds  us,  individual  and  collective  agents  in  the  periphery must  be  seen  in  the 
context  of  class  divided  societies  and  contending  domestic  social  forces.  Thus,  as  Hugo 




emphasis).  The  strength  of  this  historical  materialist  account  thus  rests  in  its  analytical 
capacity to contextualize human rationality and institutions within a wider structural  logic 
and sets of power relations historically speciﬁc to  capitalism,  such that neither  individuals 
nor  institutions  are  determinant  relations  in  themselves  (Albo  2005).  In  this  light,  the 
Mexican  and  Turkish  bank  rescues are from  the outset  interpreted  as historical  processes 
that  have  revamped  pre‐existing  institutionalized  sets  of  social  power  relations.  The 





systems.  In  Mexico  in  the  years  following  the  1910‐17  Revolution,  mobilizing  capital  for 
industrialization  was  the  ruling  elite’s  priority, which demanded  that  the  state apparatus 
help to reorganize the collapsed banking sector and to re‐establish Mexican bankers in their 
banks  (Bennett  and  Sharpe  1980,  172;  Gómez‐Galvarriato  and  Recio  2003).  The  private 
domestic  banks  then  contributed  to  ﬁnancing  development  through  oﬃcial  reserve 
requirements held in the Bank of Mexico, whose funds were channeled into priority sectors. 
In  a  like  manner  after  the  collapse  of  the Ottoman  Empire,  the  new Turkish  state  also 
needed to  mobilize domestic capital.  To  do  so, nascent  Turkish  capitalists and state elites 
articulated  a  system  of  state  and  privately  owned banks  that  co‐existed  alongside minor 
foreign  banks  during  the  1923  İzmir  Economic  Congress.  The  reserve  requirement 
mechanism and the Central Bank of Turkey helped to  fund development as in Mexico, but 
the Turkish state banks also became important agents of industrialization. 





allocation.  With  the  growth  in  markets  and  the  increasingly  generalized  use  of  money, 
banks  became  more  powerful  institutions  in  society.  Inﬂuential  family‐based  holding 
groups,  moreover,  owned  the  most  important  private  banks.  Tight  state‐market 




  As developing  countries, Mexico  and Turkey achieved signiﬁcant  levels of capitalist 
industrialization and integration into  the world market compared to colonial times. Despite 
this, the barriers presented by capitalist development strategies meant that the two societies 




late  1970s, Mexico  and  Turkey  faced  serious  ﬁnancial  and  balance  of payments  problems 
that  could  not  overcome easily  (FitzGerald  1985,  227;  Yalman  2002,  37‐8).  In Mexico,  the 
mounting  requirements placed on  the bankers triggered  investment  strikes that  led to  the 
1976  and  1982  Mexican  foreign  exchange  and debt  crises.  In  the  interests  of  re‐asserting 
state‐led  development,  the  outgoing  President  José  López  Portillo  Institutional 
Revolutionary  Party  (PRI;  Partido  Revolucionario  Institucional)  government  nationalized 
the domestic private banks on 1 September 1982 (Tello 1984). Bank nationalization under the 




that  the  control  over domestic capital  savings was more dispersed. As ﬁnancial  pressures 
mounted  in  the  late  1970s,  this  reduced  the  likelihood  of  a  severe  Mexico‐like  bankers’ 
investment strike and any pressure to nationalize the banks – if for no other reason than the 
Turkish  state  banks  controlled  about  half  the banking  sectors’  assets. Rather,  widespread 
and mounting class conﬂict meant Turkish state elites, backed by the 1980 military regime, 
intervened  on  behalf  of  the  general  interests  of  Turkish  capitalism  with  rapid  and 
authoritarian  liberalizations  (Savran  2002).  The  1980s  thus  opened  a  period  of  structural 
transition  to neoliberalism  in Mexico  and Turkey. This transition  required more access to 
capital  to  sustain investment  levels, which  drove capital  account  liberalization  in  1989.  In 
both  cases,  the turn to  ﬁnance‐led neoliberalism was met by signiﬁcant  ﬁnancial  crises by 
the mid 1990s, and then by the 1995 Mexican and 2001 banking crises.
  In  the  immediate  foreground  of  Mexico’s  1995  banking  crisis  and  rescue  package 
stand the 1991‐92 bank privatizations,  the 1994 NAFTA implementation, and the 1994  peso 
crisis.  During  the  ten  years  leading  up  to  bank  privatization,  the  PRI  de  la  Madrid  and 
Salinas  governments  had aggressively  reorganized  the banking  sector so  as  to  internalize 
proﬁt  imperatives by reducing  the number of banks,  rationalizing  the sector, promoting  a 
parallel  system  of market‐based ﬁnance,  and  by using  the  state  banks as  agents of  state‐
owned  enterprise  (SOE)  privatizations  (Marois  2008).  Bank  privatization  was  then 
announced  in May  1990  and  transpired  very  rapidly  from  June  1991  to  July  1992  earning 
$12.27  billion  (SHCP  1994,  48‐50).  Contrary  to  the  PRI  ‘democratization’  of  bank  capital 
discourse,  the  sell‐oﬀ  resulted  in  highly  concentrated  bank  ownership  patterns  under 
Mexican ﬁnancial holding groups (Vidal 2002, 22‐5). Bank privatization, moreover, occurred 
in  the  context  of  the NAFTA  negotiations  and  the  1  January  1994  launch  –  an agreement 
forged  with  the  intention  of  institutionally  tying  the  hands  of  future  governments  to  a 
neoliberal  strategy  of  development  (Guillén  Romo  2005,  89).  Privatized  banking  and  the 
new NAFTA framework intensiﬁed competition in Mexican society and generated economic 







rise  abruptly,  triggering  the  1995  banking  crisis.  This  exposed  the  over‐extension  of  large 
holding  groups’  debt,  which  thrust  the  banking  system  into  risk  of  collapse  (Banco  de 





of Turgut Özal, the Motherland Party (ANAP; Anavatan Partisi;  1983  to  1991) and the True 
Path  Party  (DYP;  Doğru  Yol  Partisi;  1991  to  1995)  administrations  undertook  dramatic 
neoliberal  reforms (Balkan and Yeldan 2002). As in Mexico, demands for greater access to 
capital encouraged ﬁnancial reforms that led to capital account liberalization in 1989, which 
encouraged  the  internalization  of  foreign  currency  and  TL  substitution  within  Turkey’s 
unstable and inﬂation‐prone economy (TBB  1999; TBB 2000). This led to a situation where 
the Turkish  state was unable to  rollover public debt and  in  1994,  according to  the World 
Bank, the “long‐predicted ﬁnancial crisis ﬁnally struck” (2005, 1). The early 1990s ﬁnance‐led 
boom came  to  an end,  earning  Turkey  the dubious moniker of being  the ﬁrst developing 
country to  face a major  ‘neoliberal’  ﬁnancial  crisis  (though  not  as severe as Mexico’s  peso 
crisis  that  followed  in December  1994)  (Öniş  2006,  249).  The  1994  Turkish crisis  did  not 
spark  an  immediate banking  crisis,  but  the banking  sector did  come  under more  intense 
competitive pressure  to  consolidate due  to  declining domestic  interest  rates,  lower proﬁt 
margins,  lower  inﬂation,  and  the  end  of  universal  insurance  on  bank  deposits.  These 
competitive pressures built up as the IMF‐orchestrated December 1999 disinﬂation program 
was unrolled. By  this  time,  the Bülent Ecevit Democratic Left Party (DSP; Demokratik  Sol 
Parti)  coalition  government  had  placed  a  total  of  eight  failed  banks,  representing  about 
eight  percent  of  all  banking  assets,  under  the  Saving  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  (TMSF; 
Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu) (World Bank 2003, 52). The 1999 disinﬂation program then 
began  to  pre‐announce  exchange  rates,  but  this  encouraged domestic banks  to  proﬁt  by 
borrowing  in short‐term  foreign currency and  then  lending  in  longer‐term TL terms. This 
created severe proﬁt‐driven credit maturity mismatches and sizeable foreign currency open 
positions through  2000  (BDDK 2002). The ﬁrst  wave of  crisis peaked  in  late October and 
November  2000  as  more  private  Turkish  banks  failed,  thus  demanding  the  government 
inject billions into  the sector. This wave set oﬀ a second larger wave of crisis by uncovering 
the  Turkish  state  banks’  problematic  exposure of billions of  dollars  in  oﬃcial  duty  losses 
(BDDK 2003, 10). The immediate trigger to  the 2001 crisis occurred on the 19th of February 
during a  dramatic quarrel  between  PM Ecevit  and President  Sezer that  sparked nearly  $5 
billion  in capital  ﬂight  –  a quarter  of Turkey’s $20  billion  in  reserves  (TBB 2001).  Turkish 





  The  emergence  of  neoliberalism  internationally  has  ﬁrst  rested  on  the  defeat  of 
organized  labour’s  capacity to  resist  structural  adjustment  and  second  on  the re‐asserted 
dominance of ﬁnance since the 1980s (Duménil and Lévy 2001; Panitch and Gindin 2004). As 
both  consequence and catalyst, global south governments of democratic and authoritarian 




in  ﬁnancial  crises  in the global  south has not  halted this, but has  instead opened market‐
oriented  restructuring  possibilities  once  thought  improbable  or  impossible  (Cypher  1989; 
Marois 2005). The Mexican 1995 and the Turkish 2001 banking rescues are signiﬁcant in this 
respect and have comparatively displayed three interrelated tendencies: (a) the socialization 
of  risk  and  debt,  (b)  the  rationalization  of  the  banking  sector,  and  (c)  the 
internationalization  of  the  ﬁnancial  apparatus.  Often  in  dialogue  with  IFIs,  their 
government elites and state managers act on behalf of the banking sector and capitalism at 
home rather than at  the behest of any individual  banker. In doing so, the bank  rescues re‐
institutionalize  revamped  forms  of  ﬁnance‐led  neoliberalism  that  maintain  structurally 
unequal social relations of power to the beneﬁt of ﬁnance.
(a) The Socialization of Debt and Risk
  The  socialization  of debt  and  risk  represents  how  neoliberal‐oriented governments 
tend to accept ownership of and responsibility for private ﬁnancial risks that have gone bad 
and instigated crisis. Mexico and Turkey’s bank rescues oﬀered individual banks immediate 
relief  to  bolster  capital  adequacy  and  remove  ‘toxic’  assets  from  their  balance  sheets. 
According  to  OECD  economists,  the  gross  ﬁscal  costs  of  bank  crises  are  transfers  from 
present  and  future  taxpayers  to  present  and  future  beneﬁciaries  of  the  rescue  packages 
(Furceri  and Mourougane  2009,  28).  This agentless and descriptive statement misses how 
the bad debts and risks are socialized because they become collectively backed by the future 
capacity  of  society  to  work,  create value,  and  pay  recurrent  taxes  to  service  the  political 
commitments. Governments do  so  to  re‐invigorate capitalism and, by extension, the social 
relations of ﬁnance. Despite the extent and depth of socialization, in most accounts of bank 
rescue the uneven relations of power remain hidden. For example, the Economist’s January 
2009 special  report  on  the  future of ﬁnance spared  the  idea  of  ‘socialization’  a mere two 
sentences within nearly two dozen pages: “Taxpayers will end up carrying the load. In eﬀect, 
the state will take on much of the debt that the private sector has decided to jettison.”
  The case of Mexico  is among  the ﬁrst emerging market  neoliberal bank  rescues. As 
the  1995  banking  crisis  unfolded,  the  Zedillo  PRI  government  coordinated  its  response 











the  1995  rescue ﬁrst  oﬀered US  dollar  liquidity  to  troubled banks  and  then a  Temporary 
Capitalization Program (Procapte)  to help Mexican banks reach an eight percent capital to 
asset  adequacy  ratio  (SHCP  1998,  34‐5;  Banco  de Mexico  1998,  156). While  no  long‐term 
costs were attributed to  these two programs,  the political  intent was  to restore immediate 
social  conﬁdence  in  the banks.  A  third more costly program  aimed  at  stretching  out  and 
restructuring  the individual debts of ﬁsheries, families, SMEs, and so on for a cost of about 
three percent of GDP in 1998 terms (SHCP 1998, 35; OECD 2002b, 155). While rising interest 
rates  and  falling  personal  incomes  meant  this  program  was  largely  ineﬀectual  for  the 
average  debtor  (Avalos  and  Trillo  2006,  25),  the  intent  was  to  encourage  individuals  to 
collectively  honor  property  rights  (that  is,  their  debt  commitments).  The  most  costly 
socialization measure involved the PRI acting on behalf of the general  interests of ﬁnance 
via  the  permanent  recapitalization  program,  which  purchased  banks’  NPLs  with  10‐year 
Mexican  state bonds (non‐negotiable and capitalizable every three months at an averaged 
CETES  rate)  (SHCP  1998,  38;  OECD  2002b,  155).  By  early  1998,  the  PRI  recognized  that 
Fobaproa  could not  redeem  these bonds as  they came due.  The  cost  of  socialization  had 
grown to $60 billion or around 15 percent of 1998 GDP – an amount ﬁve times greater than 
the  $12  billion  received  for  bank  privatization  just  a  few  years  earlier.  The  situation 
prompted Zedillo to ask Congress to oﬃcially absorb all Fobaproa debt within in March 1998 
(SHCP 1998, 51‐2), but the PRI no  longer enjoyed the political dominance it once had. After 
months  of  debate  and  public  outcry  the  National  Action  Party  (PAN;  Partido  Acción 





the  bankers’  insurance  fund  directly  to  the  federal  government  (2006,  28)  –  a  plan  that 
reﬂects Zedillo’s failed 1998 proposal.
  In  Turkey,  the  range  of  socialization measures  diﬀered,  but  the  magnitude  of  the 
crisis meant  it  cost more. At  the apex of  the 2001 banking  crisis,  the Ecevit DSP coalition 
named  a  longtime  World  Bank  executive,  Kemal  Derviş,  as  the  new  Minister  of  the 
Economy. As the Economist put it, Turkey's bickering coalition agreed to allow a technocrat 
to  spearhead reform  and restart the ﬂow of  foreign  capital  – or,  in other words,  to extend 
Turkey’s ﬁnance‐led neoliberal  strategy of development. To do so, the coalition gave Derviş 
broad  institutionalized  powers  to  rescue  the  banks,  including  control  over  the  Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK; Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu). 
By mid April,  he announced  the Transition  to  a  Strong  Economy  (TSE)  program  to  help 
renew  Turkey’s  openness  to  the  world  market  (TBB  2001;  BDDK  2002).  The  May  2001 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Banking Sector Restructuring  Program  (BSRP) was  at  the heart  of the TSE and was  to  be 
carried out  through  the  BDDK.  In  national  discourse,  the Derviş BSRP  was  portrayed  as 
capable of eliminating ﬁnancial distortions and promoting an eﬃcient, globally competitive, 





World  Bank  2003,  52).  As  the  2001  crisis  unfolded,  the  DSP  disregarded  the  legislated 
deposit coverage limits just established in June 2000 and accepted liability for 100 percent of 









the  private  risks  driving  crisis  become  the  collective  responsibility  of  present  and  future 
generations of Mexicans and Turks.
(b) The Rationalization of the Banking Sector
  Debt  and  risk  socialization  is  followed  by  a  second  tendency  of  emerging market 
bank  rescues  –  the  rationalization  of  the  banking  sector.  While  appearing  at  odds  with 
market‐discipline, the political  intent  of  rationalization deepens  the institutionalization of 
ﬁnance  in  society  and maintains  its market‐oriented  social  logic. This  is  what Demirgüç‐
Kunt and Servén get  at  regarding  the current crisis when  they  argue the  “sacred cows” of 
ﬁnancial policy are not dead: containment is not tantamount to permanent deviation (2009, 
45).  In  Mexico  and  Turkey,  this  has  involved  a  mix  of  IFI‐mediated  and  government‐
authored regulatory changes, forced mergers, failed bank takeovers, and the entry of foreign 
bank capital.
  Take for  example Derviş’  response  to  the  2001  Turkish banking  crisis  and how the 
BSRP  pressed  forward  with  a  range  of  more  restrictive  bank  regulatory  and  supervisory 
measures  to  stabilize  ﬁnance.  This  involved  the  Ecevit  DSP  coalition  amending  the  1999 
Banking Law and imposing tougher capital requirements, deﬁnitions of credit, credit limits, 
NPL provisions, balance  sheet  reporting  obligations,  capital  requirements  for mergers and 




banking as a  separate business  in its own right  (Interview, Senior Manager, Halk  Bank, 24 
13
Thomas Marois ‐ Emerging Market Bank Rescues in an Era of Finance‐Led Neoliberalism
August 2007,  İstanbul). BSRP merger  and  acquisition  tax incentives also  helped to  reduce 
the  number  of  banks  (BDDK  2003,  66).  At  the  same  time,  the  BSRP  encouraged  the 
internalization of foreign bank  capital and the formation of domestic‐foreign joint banking 
ventures as stabilizing measures. This was achieved via higher liquidity and capital adequacy 
requirements:  in  a  banking  system  where  liquidity  was  once  low,  the  policy  measure 
compelled  some  private  domestic  banks  to  seek  out  foreign  capital  to  met  the  new 
standards.  Rationalization  thus  entailed  strengthening  oversight  in  accordance  with 
Turkey’s subordinate emerging market position within the world market – wherein neither 
the state apparatus nor the banking market could sustain overly risky ﬁnancial proﬁteering. 
  The  2001 crisis  also  opened  an opportunity  for Turkish state  ﬁnancial  managers  to 
rapidly  restructure  the  state  banks  so  that,  as  the  Economist  then  recognized,  they 
functioned as if they were private, proﬁt‐seeking, market‐disciplined banks. Once the state 
bank  duty  losses  were  socialized,  the  government  annulled  nearly  100  regulations  thus 
arresting the possibility of any future political channeling of state bank resources and proﬁts 
through  duty losses,  be they developmental  or neoliberal  in  orientation.  The  state‐owned 
Emlak  Bank  was  merged  into  Ziraat  Bank,  and  the  BDDK  then  undertook  ongoing 
operational  restructuring  to  re‐craft  the  remaining  state  bank  operations  at  all  levels 
according  to market  discipline and proﬁt  imperatives (BDDK 2002; TBB  2001). State  bank 
managers  have  since  pursued  professionalization  and  harmonization  according  to  EU 
directives  and  in  preparation  for  privatization  (BDDK  2002).  The  political  intent  was  to 
remove  the  historical  socio‐political  mandate  of  state  banks  within  oﬃcial  development 
strateges in favor of institutionalized market‐oriented forces.












  As in Turkey, post‐crisis  institutional changes also  sought to  enhance Mexican bank 
supervision,  regulation,  and  to  limit  deposit protection  in  the  interests of  stability  (SHCP 
1998, 51‐2). As one example, the Zedillo 1998 reforms replaced Fobaproa with a new bankers’ 
fund – the Bank  Savings Protection Institute (IPAB;  Instituto  para  la Protección al Ahorro 
Bancario)  (Banco  de Mexico  1999,  232).  In  national  discourse,  the banking  reforms were 
needed because credit had been allowed to expand too much, and the new bankers were too 
inexperienced to  know better. Currently, the PAN President Felipe Calderón’s 2007 to  2012 
NDP continues  to privilege ﬁnancial  stability,  for example, by enhancing  the protection of 
property  rights,  promoting  ﬁnancial  competition,  and  enhancing  regulation. 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Rationalization,  like  in  Turkey,  reﬂects  Mexico’s  emerging  market  status  within  the 
international hierarchy.
   Neoliberal era crisis‐driven rationalization reforms of this kind reﬂect the chance, as 
the  current  Governor  of  the  TCMB  Durmuş  Yılmaz  (2007)  claims,  to  put  your  “house  in 
order.”  The  institutionalization of these changes  are not  apolitical  because  the ideological 





impacts  a  society’s  democratic  relationship  to  development  by  institutionally  shifting 
domestic decision‐making power in favor of domestic and foreign ﬁnance, a process that has 
a  dual  character.  On  the  one  hand,  internationalization  involves  government  and  state 
managers  accepting  responsibility  for managing  their  own  domestic  capitalist  order  such 
that they also better contribute to managing the international capitalist order (Panitch and 
Gindin 2003,  17). Currently,  this is  a key message of the G‐20  leadership, and in particular 
the US. On the  other hand,  internationalization  involves  these same actors  insulating  the 
state’s  ﬁnancial  apparatus  from  domestic politics  according  to  international  norms.  First 
among examples include the pursuit of central bank independence and inﬂation targeting as 
the  sine  qua non  of  policy  credibility  in  the modern  ﬁnance‐led neoliberal  era  (Mishkin 
2009). While credible in the eyes of ﬁnance, both measures are ultimately anti‐democratic 
because they militate against popular inﬂuence (Grabel 2000, 7). 
  The  tendency  to  internationalization  in  Mexico  has  accelerated  since  the  1995 
banking  crisis.  At  the  time,  the  PRI  merged  the  once  separate  National  Securities  and 
National Banking commissions into one – the National Banking and Securities Commission 
(CNBV;  Comisión  Nacional  Bancaria  y de  Valores)  (Banco  de Mexico  1996,  133).  Zedillo’s 
1998  reforms  then  sought,  but  fell  short  of  reaching,  full  institutional  autonomy  for  the 
CNBV  –  as  had already been  granted to  the Banco  de México  in  the  lead up to  the  1994 
NAFTA. As  the  impact  of  the  1995 crisis  settled out,  the Fox PAN government’s National 
Development Finance Program  from 2002 to 2006 continued to  bring domestic regulation 
within  international  strictures  (SHCP  2005,  105). To  do  so,  the PAN  aggressively pursued 
compliance with the BIS Basel 25 core banking principles (IMF 2006). According to one high 
ranking SHCP director, prior to 2000 and the entry of foreign capital, there was far less need 
for  the  degree  of  banking  regulation  now  required  (Interview,  Bank  and  Saving  Unit,  13 
February 2008). While praising Mexico’s eﬀorts towards improving the institutional capacity 
of  the CNBV,  the  IMF  suggests  the PAN press  forward with  full  CNBV independence and 
expanded authority (IMF 2006, 41‐3). The main idea is to  improve domestic stability and to 
eliminate  political  interference  by  enabling  the  CNBV  to  better  liaison  with  foreign 
regulators  through  joint  international  Memorandums of Understanding  (MU)  (IMF  2007, 
15). Contrary to ‘hollowed out’ accounts of the neoliberal state, governments have made the 
ﬁnancial  apparatus  more  muscular  and  better  able  to  manage  the  place  of  ﬁnance  in 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 Internationalization  in  Turkey  has  also  been  shaped  by  political  actors  trying  to 
separate “the economic from  the political”,  and indeed more aggressively so  since the 2001 
crisis  (Derviş  in  TBB,  June  2001).  For  one,  the  DSP  coalition  granted  the  TCMB  formal 
independence in response to the crisis (Yılmaz 2007, 3). The 2001 crisis also pushed the DSP 
coalition  to  augment  the  institutional  autonomy and  regulatory power  of  the  BDDK  and 
augment  the  capacity  of  the  TMSF  (BDDK  2001).  As  with  Mexico’s  CNBV,  the  BDDK 
coordinates MUs that formalize international relations between the BDDK and foreign bank 






Türkiye Bankalar Birliği).  The new 2005 Bank Law was  framed with EU accession  in mind 
and,  according  to  the  BDDK  (2006),  this  presented  an  opportunity  to  increase  ﬁnancial 
stability  by  strengthening  institutional  capacity.  The  TBB  reports  that  most  banking 
activities now have  been  harmonized  with  EU directives  and  international  best  practices 
(TBB  2007,  I‐8).  Thus,  Turkish  state  managers  have  crafted  more  muscular 
institutionalizations  of  ﬁnance  in  reference  to  foreign  standards  and  according  to  the 
ideology that economic and political processes can and ought to be separate.
  The processes of internationalization entail bolstering the institutions of ﬁnance and 
jettisoning  popular  democratic  inﬂuence.  This  tendency,  along  with  socialization  and 
rationalization, are institutional  in form, social in nature, and a matter of power relations at 
base.  Taken  as a  whole,  the  bank  rescues  thus  reﬂect  revamped  institutionalizations  that 
beneﬁt  of  domestic  and  foreign  ﬁnance  in  the  era  of  neoliberalism.  But  to  more  fully 




alongside  the  social  structures  of  world market  competition  and  the  contradictions  that 
arise therein between corporations, capital and labour, national  capitalisms, and dominant 
and  dominated  countries  that  drive  change  (Beaud  2001,  264).  The  dynamics  of 
socialization,  rationalization,  and  internationalization  are  therefore  not  interpreted  as 
determinant  in  themselves,  but  as  internally related to  the  structural  tendencies  found in 






  In  Mexico  and Turkey,  there  is  a  tendency  towards  the  centralization  of  banking 
institutions.  Centralization  is  a  historical‐structural  tendency  –  driven  by  world  market 
competition and enabled by credit availability – to combine already existing separate banks 
and forms of ﬁnance  through such things as mergers and the  formation of holding groups 
(cf.  Marx  1990,  776‐80).  Centralization  can  occur  rapidly  and  result  in  more  powerful 









however,  encouraged banking  de‐centralization  as numbers  increased to  62 by  1999  (TBB 
1981‐2000b).  But  liberalization  also  increased volatility,  and many private domestic banks 
were  closed,  taken  over  by  the  state,  and/or  merged  into  state  banks  as  the  ﬁnancial 
authorities granted  new bank  operating  licenses in  their wake. While private banking  de‐
centralized,  state managers centralized the  capital  of the  state‐owned banks:  from 1980  to 
1999,  eleven banks became four – Ziraat, Halk, Vakif, and Emlak –  through a process  that 
involved minor privatizations, mergers, and closures (TBB 1964‐2000). 




the key overall dynamics not  to  be missed, however,  is  how  large Turkish holding  groups 
gained control  over most of the private banks (Isık and Akçaoğlu 2006, 5; Ercan 2002, 30). 
The  centralization  of  banking  conferred  a  signiﬁcant  competitive  advantage  on  holding 
groups  through  easier  access  to  credit  and  the  appropriation  of  consistent  bank  proﬁts 








and  21  ﬁnancieras  (investment‐type  banks)  (Aubey  1971,  26).  As  in  Turkey,  the  holding 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groups used  their banks’  savings  to  channel  resources through  their non‐bank  aﬃliates to 
boost their market power (Del Ángel‐Mobarak 2005, 46).
With  the  sector’s  near  collapse  in  1982  and  bank  nationalization,  the  de  la Madrid  PRI 
government spearheaded the centralization of the now 58 state‐owned banks into 18 by 1986 
as  a  stabilization  measure  (ABM  2009).  The  1991‐92  bank  privatizations  and  favorable 
ﬁnancial  liberalization  policies  then  acted  as  counter‐tendencies  enabling Mexican  bank 
numbers to increase to 41 by 1996. As a result of volatility from the 1995 banking crisis, bank 
numbers again  fall  to  36 by 2000  and then to  31 by 2006 due to banking failures, mergers, 
and the reticence of Mexican authorities to grant new banking licenses (CNBV 2001‐08). As 
in  1982,  government  authorities  favored  centralization  for  stability  purposes.  The biggest 
Mexican banks today are held within very few powerful  foreign‐controlled ﬁnancial groups 
(discussed  below),  whose  proﬁt‐making  activities  have  spread  to  virtually  all  aspects  of 
ﬁnance  (IMF  2007).  The  monopolistic  power  of  these  foreign  bank  conglomerates  in 
Mexican society have raised concerns within the Calderón administration, whose 2007‐ 2012 
NDP  encourages  market‐based  solutions  to  diﬀuse  bank  concentration,  and  within  IMF 
circles currently because of the instability of their foreign aﬃliates (2009).
In both Mexico and Turkey, centralization has broadened the range of ﬁnancial instruments 
that  people  need  to  participate  in  everyday  life  under  the  control  of  fewer  and  fewer 
institutions. As the Economist’s 2009 report on ﬁnance writes “the story of commercial and 
investment banking has been broadly one of consolidation” that has evolved into a “joust of 
giant  multinationals”.  In  this  sense,  Mexico  is  the  more  advanced  case  and  Turkey  is 
following behind.  In both, nevertheless,  the  institutionalized  centralization of ﬁnance has 









foreign)  and  second,  by  individual  banking  and ﬁnancial  groups.  To  date,  the  long‐term 
tendency has been towards foreign ownership in large ﬁnancial groups. 
  As seen in Mexico  prior to the 1995 banking crisis, bank assets were concentrated in 




remained  dominant  to  this  point,  but  the  removal  of  foreign  control  restrictions  –  as 
negotiated for in the 1994 NAFTA Chapter 14 appendices – and wider ﬁnancial liberalization 
measures taken by presidents Zedillo  and Fox enabled foreign banks to  assume control  in 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the  new millennium.  From  2000  to  2002,  over  $20  billion  in  foreign  capital  entered  the 
Mexican banking market. Mexico  currently has among the highest concentrations of banks 
under foreign control in Latin America, sitting around 85 percent.
  Asset concentration is  also  evident in how the largest  banks are controlled within a 
few massive ﬁnancial  groups  that  monopolize  the  sector  (Banco  de Mexico  2007,  79,  83). 
Whereas six Mexican ﬁnancial groups informally controlled about 73 percent of all ﬁnancial 
sector  resources  in  the mid  1960s  –  including  many  dozens  of  separate  banks  and other 
ﬁnancial institutions – nearly 97 percent of all bank assets and 84 percent of all mutual fund 
assets  are  concentrated  within  largely  foreign  bank‐based  and  formally  incorporated 
ﬁnancial  groups  today  (Aubey  1971,  26;  Banco  de Mexico  2007,  50).  The  six  largest  bank‐
based groups today control over 85 percent  of all bank assets (Banco de Mexico  2007,  51). 
The largest bank, Spanish‐owned BBVA Bancomer, controls over 27 percent of bank assets, 




The  diﬀerence  is historical.  Since  1923,  private  domestic,  foreign,  and  state‐owned  banks 
have co‐existed.  In  the mid  1960s,  Turkish  state banks  controlled about  64  percent  of all 
banking assets, private domestic 27 percent, and foreign four percent (TBB 1999). By the late 
1990s  and with  ﬁnancial  liberalization,  state  bank  assets  contracted  but  to  only  about  39 
percent while private domestic bank assets expanded to  just  above 50 percent of all assets 




sector,  this more than doubled to  12 percent by 2006 (TBB  2007,  I‐39).  If minority  foreign‐
held shares in the İMKB are  included, over 35 percent of Turkish banking assets are under 




de‐concentration.  Whereas  in  1990  the  ﬁve  largest  banks  controlled  54  percent  of  all 
banking assets and the top ten banks 75 percent, by 1999 the control  of the top ﬁve banks 







  Historically,  the growing  concentrations of bank capital have arisen from structural 




points  to  “the  growth  imperative”  as  a  key  factor  while  acknowledging  “woe  betide  any 
banker who  fell  behind.”  But  the  concern  is  not  simply  that  there are  larger  institutions 




  Bank  capital  centralization and concentration  tendencies  in Mexico  and Turkey are 
structural  factors  behind  a  third  structural  tendency  –  the  intensiﬁcation  of  banking. 
Intensiﬁcation  involves  the  acceleration  of  competitive  imperatives  imposed  on  banking 
capitalists,  individually and collectively (and,  by  extension,  on  bank  labour and  society  in 
general).  In  the  postwar  period,  Mexican  and  Turkish  banks  intensiﬁed  competition  by 
extending multi‐branch banking, which  rendered  relatively stable  proﬁt  levels (TBB  1999; 
del  Ángel‐Mobarak  2005,  52‐4).  But  as  ISI  came  under  ﬁnancial  stress  in  the  1970s,  this 
model of banking also came under ideological attack as a form of ﬁnancial ‘repression’  that 
has since become almost  synonymous with attacks against  the  ‘politicization’  of economic 
decisions (Shaw 1973; McKinnon 1973; La Porta et al. 2002; Girma and Shortland 2008). New 
market‐oriented banking strategies arose as emerging market banks had to  compete in the 
world market  for capital  resources and at home for proﬁt by  intensifying productivity and 
eﬃciency imperatives on branches and employees.
  Take,  for example, Turkey’s post  1980s transition to  ﬁnance‐led neoliberalism. Over 
the  span  of  two  decades  the  ratio  of  bank  assets  to  gross  national  product  more  than 
doubled from 31 to 80 percent (TBB 2000).  But during this same period, there was very little 
growth  in  the number of bank  branches for foreign,  state,  and private domestic banks.  In 
the  private  domestic  banks,  employee  numbers  grew  by  less  than  ﬁve  percent,  despite 
overcoming  the state banks in overall  asset control  (shown above). Fewer bank  employees 
handling  more  assets  helped  drive  productivity  gains  and  contribute  to  the  more  than 
doubling of the private banks’ return on assets (ROA) proﬁt ratios, which grew from about 1 
percent pre 1980s to over 2 percent by the late 1990s (TBB 1999). With Prime Minister Özal’s 
initial  and  rapid  liberalization  eﬀorts,  Turkish  private  domestic  banks  also  turned  to 
leveraging more capital  to  earn higher (and  riskier)  return on equity  (ROE) proﬁts, which 
grew  from  about  35  percent  pre  1980  to  just  over  60  percent  in  the  late  1990s.  The 
culmination  of  leveraged  and  high  risk  bank  proﬁteering  amidst  domestic  political  and 
economic  instability  led  to  the  2000  and  2001  banking  crisis.  Stricter  crisis‐driven  state 











the  1980s  (TBB  2000).  In  addition,  the  state  agricultural  bank,  Ziraat,  serves  the  unique 
social  role  of  institutionally  integrating  Turkish  farmers  and  peasantry  into  the  Turkish 
payments  system.  This  too  has  impacted  proﬁtability  (which  was  not  the  mandated 
objective of any state bank prior to  2001). With  the 2001 crisis,  the  exposure of neoliberal 
duty losses, and subsequent state bank reorganization under the BSRP, the number of Halk 
and Ziraat  employees was cut by over 40  percent  and  the number of branches reduced by 
over  30  percent.  As  a  result,  the  asset  size  per  state  bank  employee  doubled  from  $0.7 
million in December 2001 to $1.4 million by August 2003 as the asset size per branch almost 
doubled  from  $13.9 million  to  $26.1 million  (BDDK  2003,  13‐4).  Consequently,  state  bank 
ROA had reached 2.2 percent by 2003, then rising to 2.8 percent by 2008 without excessively 
risky leveraged debt since ROE measures have remained in the 20 to  25 percent range (TBB 
2004‐08).  The  growth  in  proﬁts  notably  occurred  within  an  international  expansionary 
phase,  especially  within  the  global  south.  And  as  the  current  world  ﬁnancial  crisis  has 
unfolded, Turkish bank proﬁts have suﬀered, but not dramatically. The largest state, private 
domestic,  and  foreign  banks  remain  quite  proﬁtable  unlike  their  US  and  European 
counterparts. The BDDK emphasizes this  is due to  the 2001 crisis‐driven reforms that have 
made the banks’ balance sheets free of high‐risk toxic assets and that raised capital adequacy 
levels  to  nearly  19  percent  –  not  to  mention  productivity  gains  through  branch  and 
employee austerity.
  In  the Mexican case during the 1980s,  the nationalized banks underwent a series of 
state‐authored austerity measures meant  to  intensify competition domestically. While  the 
number of  potential  bank  users  grew  by  33.9  percent  from  1982  to  1988,  the  number of 
branches grew only by .05 percent thus pushing up productivity imperatives. Bank workers 
also suﬀered real wage reductions such that by the time bank privatization was announced 
in  1990,  the  unions welcomed  it  demanding  a  100  percent  wage  increase  (Weiser  1990). 
These measures  improved  proﬁtability  at  a  time  when  the  banks  were  state‐owned.  The 
state banks’  operations were also more restricted by state  regulation and ﬁscal  obligations 
than  the  newly  emerging  non‐bank  private  ﬁnancial  institutions  that  the  PRI  placed  in 
parallel competition (Pesquera 1990; Marois 2008). With the 1991‐92 bank privatizations and 
1994 NAFTA came intensiﬁed proﬁt  imperatives  in the  lead up  to  the 1995 banking  crisis. 
One competitive  response of the new bank owners  followed from state bank austerity and 
the  relative  growth  in  ‘unbanked’  Mexicans:  the  number  of  branches  post‐privatization 
exploded by nearly 36 percent to capture Mexican savings. At the same time, however, bank 
employee  numbers  fell  by  13  percent  (OECD  1998,  187‐90).  Then  SHCP  manager  Ortiz 
celebrated the resulting high proﬁt levels, which were more than double those found in the 
US and Europe (1993, 263).
  Following  the  1995  banking  crisis,  the  number  of  branches  again  expanded  by  12 
percent  from  1996  to  2000  to  captured  unbanked  persons’  savings  (OECD  2004,  304‐7). 
More  importantly,  bank  employees  lost  jobs  as  bank  owners  drove  up  employee 
productivity: whereas in  1994 Mexican private banks averaged 29.25 employees per branch 





over 25 percent  thus maintaining productivity  levels  (CNBV 2001‐08). As  in Turkey,  bank 
proﬁtability  responded  with  phenomenal  growth  (CNBV  2001‐08).  Aggregate  ROA  ratios 
expanded more than two and half times from 0.94 to 2.75. On average, ROE did not outpace 
ROA, which also doubled from 9.69 to  19.93  therefore suggesting less risky proﬁt expansion 
that  is  not  heavily dependent  on  leveraged  debt  –  again  in  contrast  to  US  and European 
banks. Notably according to the Deputy Governor of the BM, José Sidaoui (2006), the recent 
expansion in bank proﬁts is closely tied to bank employee reductions.




consumer debt,  and minimized  less  proﬁtable  loans  to  productive  activities  and SMEs  in 
order to augment proﬁtability (Guillén Romo 2005; Toporowski 2007; Stallings 2006). These 
too are vital  to the current phase of development,  and  in fact direct  attention towards the 
ﬁnance‐led  underpinnings  of  neoliberal  strategies  and  the  growing  social  signiﬁcance  of 
ﬁnance. 
  Intensiﬁcation  follows  from  the  growing  scope  and  magnitude  of ﬁnance  (that  is, 
centralization  and  concentration)  and the growth  in competitive  banking  imperatives  for 
control  over  domestic  savings  and  the  banking  market.  Intensiﬁcation  is  experienced 







  The  institutional  tendencies  of bank  rescues  and  structural  tendencies  of  banking 





nevertheless  disciplines  decision‐making  processes  according  to  universalized  ﬁnancial 
imperatives.
  Cast  in this  light, the lessons of emerging market banking rescue have not been lost 
today.  At  the  time of writing,  the G‐20 had  released a  Report  following  the 15 November 
2008 Washington meeting  and  in  the  lead up  to  the  2 April  2009 London meeting  – The 







Second,  to  reform  and  strengthen  the  global  financial  and  economic  system  to  restore 
confidence and trust. Third, to put the global economy on track for sustainable growth.
  These are not  the goals of ﬁnance  in  retreat. The intent  is unequivocally  to  rescue 
global capitalism and the place of ﬁnance therein. While a challenge to the liberal orthodoxy 
found in  the US and UK,  the G‐20  action plan  to date remains well within  the conﬁnes of 
the historically constitutive form of ﬁnance‐led neoliberalism found in Mexico and Turkey. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  neoliberal  crises,  the  contradictions  they  bring  to  light,  and  the 
changes  they  drive may not  lead  to  substantive  social  change.  But  critical  scholars  must 
remain  sober  about  the  relations  of  power  and  their  institutionalizations  deﬁning  the 
current conjuncture. If one of the greatest victories for advocates of neoliberalism since the 
1980s  is  the  defeat  of  organized  labour’s  capacity  to  resist  structural  adjustment, 
ﬂexibilization,  and  so  on,  then  two  of  the  greatest  victories  for advocates  of  ﬁnance‐led 
neoliberalism  since the  1990s  include, ﬁrst,  the institutionalized capacity  to  shift  the  risks 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